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Abstract
Despite the rapid increase in the returns to higher education witnessed in
the labor market over the past few decades, there has also been a marked
increase in the share of individuals who dropout of college or university. To
boost student persistence in higher education, several Canadian provincial gov-
ernments introduced a set of reforms that were designed as subsidies for college
graduation. In addition, these policies were designed to discourage internal mi-
gration following graduation. Using data from both administrative tax records
as well as longitudinal surveys, I analyze the eﬀectiveness of these policies. The
main ﬁndings are that the programs had no eﬀect on internal migration, but
signiﬁcantly reduced college dropout rates.
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1 Introduction
In the past several decades there has been a large increase in college and university
enrollment. There has also been a large increase in the college dropout rate (Turner,
2004). Furthermore, completion rates have stagnated among recent cohorts, as dis-
cussed in Oreopoulos and Petronijevic (2013). Currently, the six-year graduation
rate in four-year colleges in the US is 58% and the seven-year completion rate at a
large sample of Canadian universities is 84%.1 With dropout rates being as large
as they are, many have started to ask what can be done to increase college persis-
tence.2 This paper examines a set of tax policies which included strong incentives for
college graduation, oﬀering tax credits totalling between $15,000 and $25,000. Four
Canadian provinces have oﬀered these credits to recent graduates in an eﬀort to curb
outﬂows of graduates to other provinces. This paper analyzes the impact that these
programs had on college enrollment, college dropout, and migration decisions.
These programs have similar aims to the various Merit Scholarship programs of-
fered by several American state governments.3 Both the Merit Scholarships and the
retention credits attempt to raise the average level of educational attainment within
a jurisdiction. The merit programs and the retention programs both tie educational
funding to a geographic location but the merit programs do not restrict where recip-
ients can reside post-graduation. The Merit Scholarships oﬀer incentives to enroll in
college in a speciﬁed location, while the retention credits oﬀer incentives to graduate
from college and to reside in a speciﬁed location after graduation. Additionally, the
Merit Scholarships oﬀer ﬁnancial assistance during the years of college enrollment,
while the retention credits oﬀer assistance after graduation. While the Merit Schol-
arships have received considerable attention, there has been very little analysis of
the Graduate Retention Credits.4 This paper provides the ﬁrst analysis of causal
outcomes of these programs.
Concern has been given to the local stock of human capital in recent years, as
an important factor for regional economic growth and development. In particular,
1The American ﬁgure is from National Center for Education Statistics (2012) and the Canadian
ﬁgure is the author's calculation using data from Maclean's Magazine (2014).
2See for example, Bailey and Dynarski (2011), Attewell, Heil and Reisel (2011), and Turner
(2004) among many others.
3Fifteen states now oﬀer some form of merit scholarship, and the eﬀectiveness of these various
programs has been studied by Fitzpatrick and Jones (2012).
4Essaji and Neill (2010) detail the costs and program features of these credits but not the
consequences of these programs.
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several researchers have studied the eﬀectiveness of various policies at increasing
the local stock.5 The lock stock of graduates has proved diﬃcult to increase as
higher levels of education also increase an individuals' likelihood to emigrate within
country (Malamud and Wozniak, 2012). Other research has suggested that Merit
Scholarships do not increase the retention of college-bound students after gradu-
ation(Sjoquist and Winters, 2013b). In part, the retention programs were intro-
duced to discourage internal migration since historically many graduates have moved
provinces after they graduate.6 This paper additionally analyzes whether the pro-
grams changed migration patterns of recent graduates, and ﬁnds the patterns un-
changed.
Using both administrative and survey data the programs are found not to have
an impact on migration decisions. This perhaps explains why one of the provinces,
Nova Scotia, recently cancelled its graduate retention program.7 This paper also
introduces a new proxy for college graduation into the Longitudinal Administrative
Databank. The analysis shows that the programs did have a signiﬁcant impact
on reducing college dropout rates, by 4.1% among individuals 18-23. Interestingly,
there was no estimated increase in the likelihood of enrolling in college. These results
are opposite of what is typically found when tuition is reduced, where enrollment
increases, but completion rates stagnate.8
The remainder of this paper is as follows, Section 2 places the programs in the
context of the literature. Section 3 gives a detailed overview of the various grad-
uate retention programs under study. Section 4 describes the linear Diﬀerence-in-
Diﬀerences (DiD) estimation strategy and the relevant treatment and comparison
groups. As inference with DiD is diﬃcult, especially with few treatment and com-
parison groups, the methodology for inference is discussed in section 4.3. Section 5
describes the administrative and survey data sources and the outcomes of interest.
Results are discussed in Section 6, which presents evidence from both data sources
that the programs had a signiﬁcant impact on decreasing college dropout rates, but
did not decrease out of province migration. Section 7 concludes.
5See for instance, Groen (2011), and Winters (2014).
6The Saskatchewan government mentions that there has been signiﬁcant leakage of post-
secondary graduates outside the province(The Saskatchewan Labour Market Commission's, 2009).
7See http://www.novascotia.ca/finance/en/home/taxation/tax101/personalincometax/
grr.aspx for more details.
8Cohodes and Goodman (2014) ﬁnd completion rates decreased among those treated by the
Massachusetts Merit Scholarship.
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2 Context of the Retention Programs
This paper investigates how individuals respond to subsidies for college graduation.
Starting in 2005, several Canadian provinces oﬀered `Graduate Retention Credits',
in an eﬀort to discourage recent graduates from moving out of province. The design
of these programs oﬀered large tax credits which were conditional on graduation.
The programs are explained in greater detail in Section 3. In general, the programs
oﬀered between $15,000 and $25,000 in tax credits to recent university graduates.
The credits refunded between 50% and 97% of average four-year total tuition in
these provinces. This paper examines the impact that these programs had on a host
of education and migration decisions. It ﬁnds that the programs decreased dropout
rates by 4.1%.
The witnessed increase in dropout rates is surprising given that the relative re-
turns to education have increased over the same time period. Deming and Dynarski
(2009) ﬁnd that real wages for high school graduates fell by one-third from 1972
to 2005, while real wages for college graduates held steady. For men, the bache-
lor's degree wage premium was 22% in 1972 and it had increased to 60% by 2003.
Findings such as these, lead Oreopoulos and Petronijevic (2013) to summarize that
although the returns are heterogeneous, college is a worthwhile investment for both
the average and the marginal student.
The increase in the dropout rate would not be as worrying if the beneﬁts of going
to college increased linearly in years of education. However, it has been known since
Hungerford and Solon (1987) that there are degree eﬀects or sheepskin eﬀects con-
ferred on those who graduate.9 More recent literature has found that degree eﬀects
exist across the distribution of earnings, Oreopoulos and Petronijevic (2013), and
that earnings for those with some-college are only slightly higher than the earnings
of high school graduates. Within Canada, Ferrer and Riddell (2008) estimate sheep-
skin eﬀects in wages for holders of bachelor's degrees on the order of 20% for women
and 16% for men. Additionally, Riddell and Song (2011) ﬁnd that re-employment
prospects, following a job termination, are higher for college graduates. Finally,
Jepsen, Troske and Coomes (2014) ﬁnd both earnings premiums and higher levels
of employment for community college graduates. The prevalence of sheepskin ef-
9The literature on sheepskin eﬀects is vast and has found among other things that the eﬀects
are larger for females and minorities, Belman and Heywood (1991), Ferrer and Riddell (2008); and
exist in several countries, Denny and Harmon (2001).
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fects across a variety of countries and education levels suggests that individuals who
dropout possibly do so at signiﬁcant private cost.10 For example, Webber (2016) es-
timates that for the median student the net present value of a degree to be between
$85,000 - $300,000 depending on the major. That the programs decreased dropout
rates is surprising, given the large rewards in the labor market for graduating.
In addition to the private costs there are also social costs from dropping out.
Schneider and Yin (2012) perform a `back of the envelope' calculation and suggest
large losses in income tax revenue from dropouts. There is also speculation that many
new jobs will require higher levels of education suggesting diminished employment
prospects for dropouts going forward. According to the United States Bureau of
Labor Statistics, job growth in occupations requiring some post secondary education
is expected to outpace job growth in occupations requiring a high school education
or less over the coming decade (Bureau of Labour Statistics, U.S. Department of
Labor., 2012).
This paper investigates whether the programs were able to retain recent gradu-
ates, as the programs were intended to do. There are many reasons why a provincial
government would want to retain these individuals. The post-secondary education
(PSE) spillovers literature presents evidence that higher levels of education beneﬁts
the community at large. When analyzing minimum schooling laws, Acemoglu and
Angrist (2001) ﬁnd evidence that there are small positive external returns to an extra
year of education. Moretti (2004) uses the presence of a land grant university as an
instrumental variable for college attendance to examine the impact of increasing the
share of college graduates in a city. He shows that a percentage point increase in the
presence of college graduates is associated with increased wages for others: specif-
ically a 1.9% wage increase for high-school dropouts and a 1.6% increase for high
school graduates. In a similar study, Shapiro (2006) examined American data at the
metropolitan level and ﬁnds that a 10% increase in a city's concentration of college
graduates was on average followed by a 0.8% increase in employment growth. Aghion
et al. (2009) ﬁnd that investment in four-year college educations has a positive eﬀect
on economic growth.
The programs are unique in that they place no restrictions on pre-college res-
idency, or on where one studies, but restrict where one works after graduation.
10However, it is possible that the dropout decision is welfare improving as simulations in Stine-
brickner and Stinebrickner (2013) show that newly enrolled students who perform poorly learn that
staying in school is not worthwhile.
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While most education funding for students has been oﬀered with few geographical
constraints, there have been a few exceptions. There are the aforementioned Merit
Scholarships, and diﬀerential tuition levels for in-state and out-of-state students.
Some jurisdictions, including Canadian provinces, have experimented with targeted
retention/attraction programs to attract individuals in certain occupations, such as
doctors and nurses.11 Maryland has oﬀered scholarships to residents which require
an individual to work one year in the state for each year they receive a scholarship
(Groen, 2011). In 2012, Kansas oﬀered incentives such as student debt repayments
and income tax waivers to attract individuals to rural Kansas. Unlike the graduate
retention programs, to be eligible for the incentives individuals must prove they have
resided outside of the state for at least the previous ﬁve years.12 Finally, in 2007,
Maine introduced a program generally similar to the retention credits studied here.
This program repaid up to $5500 per year in student loans for bachelor degree hold-
ers from a Maine college.13 To my knowledge, the outcomes of either the program
in Maine or Kansas have yet to been analyzed.
Given the large value of these credits, it is interesting to compare the programs
to other large scale education ﬁnancing reforms. Gunnes, Kirkebøen and Rønning
(2013) investigate an experiment in Norway where students were oﬀered a ﬁnancial
incentive of $3000 (USD) if they graduated `on time'. They ﬁnd that the incen-
tive reduced mean graduation delay by 0.23 semesters per year treated. Similarly,
Garibaldi et al. (2012) ﬁnd that at Bocconi University a 1000 e increase in tuition
reduced the likelihood of late graduation by 5.2%, with no increase in the dropout
rate. Arendt (2013) ﬁnds that a large increase in grants decreased dropout rates, but
had no impact on completion rates after controlling for various student and parental
characteristics. Dowd (2004) ﬁnds that an increased amount of subsidized loans in
the ﬁrst year of college enrollment increased persistence. Recently, Denning (2017)
found that additional ﬁnancial aid accelerates graduation rates for university seniors.
Past literature on ﬁnancial aid suggests that is can be diﬃcult to predict the
impact of a reform as administrative details and program knowledge are important.
Deming and Dynarski (2009) show that `ﬁnancial aid' is not a homogeneous good and
that paperwork matters. Programs with high administrative hurdles have smaller
11See Reamy (1994) and Mullan (1999).
12For more information of the Kansas program see http://http://www.kansascommerce.com/
index.aspx?nid=320
13For more information see http://www.opportunitymaine.org/
opportunity-maine-program/frequently-asked-questions/.
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beneﬁts. The retention credits are relatively easy to apply for, and in some provinces
can be claimed as part of provincial tax returns. The salience of these programs,
especially among high school students, is an open question. McGuigan, McNally
and Wyness (2012) surveyed high school students in London, England after recent
tuition reforms and found that roughly half of the students surveyed were unaware
of key features of the reforms.
3 Background of the Graduate Retention Programs
The four Canadian provinces that have implemented graduate retention programs
are Saskatchewan, Manitoba, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia.14 Table 1 provides an
overview of the various program attributes and how they diﬀer across provinces.15
Broadly speaking the programs are quite similar, and the amounts they oﬀer to
college and university graduates are of the same order of magnitude. All of the
programs are income tax credits, though the characteristics of the credits diﬀer
across provinces. Only one of the credits is refundable, though most of the credits
do roll-over.16
Saskatchewan and Manitoba do not require a separate application for the gradu-
ate retention credits, which can be claimed on income tax returns. Nova Scotia and
New Brunswick require separate applications to claim the credits. Three of the four
programs determine the maximum credit based on the amount of tuition paid, while
Nova Scotia oﬀers a ﬁxed amount to each recent graduate. The proportion of tuition
refunded in each province varies, with up to 100% of tuition being refundable in
Saskatchewan and 50% being refundable in New Brunswick. The maximum amount
of the credits is the same in both of these provinces, but given the diﬀering tuition
refund percentages a student would have had to pay $40,000 in tuition to receive the
maximum credit in New Brunswick, but only $20,000 in Saskatchewan. Finally, the
14See Essaji and Neill, 2010 for a summary of the various GRP programs.
15Quebec also operates a smaller wage subsidy program for people in remote, resource-rich re-
gions who work in the resource industry, with eligibility contingent on holding a degree related to
your current occupation. Given the speciﬁcity of this program it is ignored in the analysis. For
more details about the Quebec program see http://www.revenuquebec.ca/en/citoyen/credits/
credits/credits_reduisant/nouv_diplome/
16Speciﬁcally until 2012 Saskatchewan oﬀered a refundable credit, which meant that if individuals
earned insuﬃcient income to claim the maximum annual amount, they would receive the diﬀerence
in the form of a refund. In 2012, Saskatchewan allowed the credit to roll-over, but ended the
refundability provision. All but Nova Scotia oﬀers a roll-over provision, which allows the unused
portion of the credit to accrue over time. This means that eventually an individual will be able to
claim the maximum allowable credit.
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total costs of each program are broadly similar in each of the provinces, ranging from
$24-$35 million per year. These ﬁgures are estimated to increase over the coming
years as many of these programs are new and there are not yet six or seven cohorts
of graduates claiming these credits. In early 2014, the government of Nova Scotia
eliminated its Graduate Retention Rebate. The government cites the failure of the
programs to retain graduates as the reason for cancelling the programs.17 This is
perhaps not surprising as results in Section 6 suggest that the various programs did
not alter internal migration decisions.
Aside from the retention credits the provincial and federal governments invest
heavily in both post-secondary institutes and students. Essaji and Neill (2010) pro-
vide a summary of the characteristics and costs of the various student funding pro-
grams currently in operation in Canada, and thoroughly summarize the graduate
retention programs. In addition to the programs mentioned in that paper, several
provinces have recently adjusted their approach to funding post-secondary educa-
tion. For instance, Ontario previously introduced a tuition credit where students
are eligible for a 30% rebate of their Ontario college or university tuition.18 More
recently, this grant was replaced by an across the board 10% reduction in tuitions.19
Additionally, proposed tuition increases in Quebec resulted in student strikes lasting
for over six months. Further information about the details and costs of government
funding for post secondary education can be found in Neill (2013).
The graduate retention programs are operationally quite diﬀerent than the other
means of government funding for post-secondary education.20 The most distinct
feature is that they base eligibility on graduation. Another unique feature is that
their beneﬁts are provided solely after graduation. Ontario's rebates refunded tuition
in the year that it was paid. Similarly, the federal and provincial tuition tax credits
and education amounts are claimed during the years enrolled in school.21 Both of
17See http://www.novascotia.ca/finance/en/home/taxation/tax101/personalincometax/
grr.aspx for more details.
18The grant tops out at $1680 for university tuition and $770 for college tuition, provided
that their parents earn $160,000 or less per year, see https://osap.gov.on.ca/OSAPPortal/en/
PostsecondaryEducation/Tuition/index.htm for more details.
19https://news.ontario.ca/maesd/en/2019/01/government-for-the-people%
2dto-lower-student-tuition-burden-by-10-per-cent.html
20A recent summary of American tax beneﬁts for college attendance can be found in Dynarski
and Scott-Clayton (2016). Bergman, Denning and Manoli (2019) in a randomized control trial ﬁnds
that emailing students about potential tax breaks does not aﬀect enrollment decisions.
21Similar programs in the United States were recently analyzed in Hoxby and Bulman (2016)
and were not found to increase college enrollment.
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these are non-refundable so they typically do not ease a student's budget constraint
until after graduation, as explained in Neill (2013). Student's budget constraints are
a current concern in education policy, since it has been shown that increased ﬁnancial
aid improves college enrollment(Sartarelli, 2011). The retention credits do nothing to
ease this constraint while enrolled, but expand a student's post graduation budget.
Oﬀsetting the less than ideal timing of the beneﬁts, is the fact that most student
loans require repayment following graduation and the payouts from the programs
coincide with the repayment schedule for student loans.22
The rebate schedules of these programs introduces an added complexity to cal-
culating the costs of attending university. For example, if a student in Saskatchewan
paid the average university tuition for four years starting in the fall of 2007, then
her annual tuition would have been $5015, $5064, $5173, and $5431. Of the $20,683
paid in tuition, they would be eligible for a $20,000 rebate (or 96.69%), paid out in
the following annual instalments: $2000,$2000,$2000,$2000,$4000,$4000,$4000. De-
termining the net present cost of such a decision is perhaps not the easiest task for
a student in their ﬁnal year of high school. Moreover, in most cases individuals need
to have a sizeable income to receive the full amount of the credit in the least amount
of time.23 Aspects of these programs are similar to the UK tuition reforms where
the net present liability of tuition depends on labour market outcomes after leaving
school.24
Another distinct feature of these programs is that they are place dependent.
This is an unusual characteristic of education funding, but it does align the subsidy
with the provinces' goals of having a well-educated labour force, rather than a large
number of college and university students. While the programs are designed to retain
an individual in a province, they are not targeted towards those on the margin of
emigrating. As a result, the programs oﬀer generous tuition rebates to all those
who were never contemplating leaving the province. However, these rebates are
conditional on graduation and thus may inﬂuence college graduation and dropout
decisions. Having explained how these programs operate institutionally, it is worth
considering how they may inﬂuence an individual's decisions theoretically.
22The analysis discussed in Section 6 directly estimates the impact of the credits on interest paid
for student loans.
23The roll-over provisions oﬀered by many provinces mean that the entire value of the credit will
eventually be received, but over a longer time horizon.
24In the UK, the full value of tuition is loaned to students while in school, and repayment is
conditional on post schooling wages. (McGuigan, McNally and Wyness, 2012)
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4 Identiﬁcation and Inference Strategy
I propose a simple model of how the introduction of graduate retention credits could
impact an individual's decision making. I then describe how the impacts proposed
in the model will be estimated using a linear diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DiD) equa-
tion. Finally, as inference with DiD can be diﬃcult, the procedure for inference is
discussed.
4.1 A Simple Model
Let us consider the situation of a student who has just ﬁnished high school. The
individual wants to maximize her utility which is a function of both her discretionary
income C˜ and quality of life (QoL). She is able to do so by choosing only two things:
her level of education and the city in which she resides. Cities inﬂuence her quality
of life, her earnings, and her taxes. Conceptually, we can imagine this individual
solving the following problem:
max
educ1∈{hs,c,u}
educ2∈{hs,c,C,u,U}
city1,2,3∈X
U1(C˜1, QoL1) + βU2(C˜2, QoL2) + +β
2U3(C˜3, QoL3),
such that
QoLi =f(cityi),
C˜1 =Y1(educ1, city1) + SL1(educ1)−
taxes(city1)− rent(city1)− tuition(educ1),
C˜2 =Y2(educ2, city2) + SL2(educ2)− (1 + r)SL1(educ1|educ2)
− taxes(city2)− rent(city2)− tuition(educ2),
C˜3 =Y3(educ2, city3)− (1 + r) ∗ SL2(educ2)
− taxes(city3, educ2)− rent(city3).
The problem is to maximize her utility across three periods; two periods in which
she can possibly further her education and the ﬁnal period. Utility in the second and
third periods is discounted by an exogenously given discount factor, β. Simplifying,
assume that she can only make the following educational choices: in the ﬁrst period
she can choose no further education and remain a high school graduate (hs), she
can attend a community college (c), or she can attend university (u). Additionally,
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she can choose the city in which she will either work or attend school from the set
of cities, X. In the second period, she can choose to either remain in school, or to
dropout of school. If she chooses not to continue her education in the ﬁrst period,
by assumption, she remains at education level hs. If she attended college in the ﬁrst
period she can either enter the workforce with some college, c, or ﬁnish her program
and graduate, C. Similarly, if she attended university in the ﬁrst period she can either
enter the workforce with some university, u, or ﬁnish her program and graduate, U.
In the ﬁrst two periods the educational decision will aﬀect consumption in several
ways. Obtaining additional education requires a good deal of time, and as such will
negatively impact earnings, Y , in the ﬁrst period. Additional education has a direct
tuition cost, which must be paid in the current period. Student loans (SL) are
available to help pay tuition and provide additional consumption in the ﬁrst two
periods if additional education is chosen, but they must be repaid with interest, r,
in the third period. The individual is free to relocate to a new city after entering
the workforce. Education is assumed to increase earnings in the third period. The
graduate retention programs introduce an education argument to the tax function
in the third period, as in certain cities the individual will face lower taxes, given
earnings, than a similar person with a lower level of education on account of receiving
a graduate retention tax credit. Rent is included in the model to reﬂect the fact that
there are some non-traded goods that people must consume, the price of which is
determined by the city of residence.
Reﬂecting on the impact of the graduate retention programs through the lens of
this model reveals several dimensions in which the programs might have an impact.
The most direct impact is that consumption in the third period is higher in a city
where an individual is eligible for a credit, with all else being equal. Accordingly,
if wages, taxes, and quality of life are all equal between two cities, then if one city
oﬀered a credit and the other did not we should expect the city with the credit to
be the chosen residence. Moreover, the availability of a credit will increase overall
consumption in the three periods for those who go to school, so we should expect
that the introduction of a retention credit will increase educational attainment. This
follows from the fact that when a location oﬀers a credit, the credit increases overall
three-period consumption for graduates. This increase in consumption makes ob-
taining further education relatively more attractive. A third possible impact may
occur because the decrease in taxes from a credit coincides with student loan repay-
ments. If there is heterogeneity in the amount of student loans outstanding, then its
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probable that those with larger amounts of debt would be more likely to locate in a
city oﬀering a credit. Similarly, those with student loans may be able to accelerate
their debt repayment if they receive a credit.
The graduate retention programs have one additional channel of inﬂuence. If
people have already decided to enroll in school in expectation of receiving a credit
upon graduation then the costs of dropping out of school are more severe than they
would have been otherwise. In the absence of a credit the potential costs of dropping
out is the forgone higher wages that one might earn after graduating. The presence
of a credit increases the cost of dropping out by disqualifying an individual from
receiving the credit. One can alternatively think about the credits as a fee/rebate
program, wherein payment is made up front, and a rebate is oﬀered on graduation.
If one expected to receive in the third period a refund proportional to her ﬁrst period
tuition in period three, then the decision to dropout in period two would retroactively
increase the `expected' cost of going to school in period one.
Any inﬂuence that a program may have will depend on the age at which an
individual was when the program was announced. The model is written as though
the program is in place in period zero. This will be the case for individuals who
reach the end of high school in or after the year a program is announced. However,
there are individuals for which the programs were announced when they were in
period one or period two. For these individuals, the enrollment decision will have
already been made, thus the programs are more likely to impact the migration and
graduation decisions. The empirical analysis will account for these diﬀerences. The
model above is framed in terms of an individual's decision, which matches well with
the micro level data used for analysis. With these possible outcomes in mind, I now
discuss the estimation strategy.
4.2 Estimating Equation
A linear diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DiD) approach will be used. Given that the impacts
of the programs may depend on the age an individual was when the programs were
announced, the analysis will be split into two parts. The ﬁrst part will estimate
the impact that the programs had on period one and two decisions, using data on
individuals aged 18-23. The second part will estimate the impact the programs had
on period three decisions, using data on individuals 23-28. Individuals who turned
either 18 (or 23) in a province oﬀering a retention credit will be regarded as `treated'.
In the analysis, individuals in the provinces oﬀering graduate retention programs
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listed in Table 1 will be regarded as `treated', while individuals in the other provinces
will be regarded as the `comparison' group. The linear DiD will then compare the
changes in outcomes over time in provinces with retention credits to changes in
outcomes over time in provinces without. Identiﬁcation using DiD requires there to
be common support between the treatment and comparison groups, and common
trends prior to the introduction of the programs in both groups, see DiNardo and
Lee (2011) for additional details.
The sample used for analysis is diﬀerent for the early period and late period analy-
sis, given diﬀering concerns about common support. The early period analysis, which
focuses on educational outcomes, uses individuals from all Canadian provinces.25 The
late period analysis, which focuses on migration decisions, will look at the impact
of the programs in the Atlantic provinces. The Atlantic provinces oﬀer a useful set-
ting for conventional DiD analysis of migration. The Atlantic region is comprised
of two provinces with retention programs: Nova Scotia and New Brunswick; and
two provinces without: Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland and Labrador.
There is the additional beneﬁt of interprovincial migration being nearly symmetric
within the Atlantic Region.26 Accordingly, the assumption of common trends in in-
terprovincial migration is more realistic when restricting the sample to the Atlantic
provinces.
The impacts of the credits on early period outcomes are estimated by the following
equation:
Yist = c+ βGRP ∗ I[GRP Prov at 18ist ∗ age GRP announcedist]
+TRENDSst + PROVi +AGEi + BIRTH YEARi + ist
In the equation there is a set of province dummy variables, a set of birth year
dummy variables, a set of province speciﬁc time trends, and a set of age dummy vari-
ables. Aside from age dummies there are no control variables, as the unconditional
impact of the programs is of primary concern. The coeﬃcient of interest is βGRP
the DiD coeﬃcient. This coeﬃcient will capture the marginal impact of being in a
province with a retention credit, for those who were young enough to be eligible for
a credit. The variable for this coeﬃcient is an indicator variable for the interaction
25As mentioned above, the majority of Canadians attend university within their own province.
Accordingly, I assume that changes in the net cost of attending university in one province are
unlikely to aﬀect the decision of someone in another province to attend university.
26See Statistics Canada, CANSIM table 051-0019.
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between living in a province oﬀering a credit and being young when the credit was
announced. This variable will be equal to one for those who turned 18: in Nova Scotia
in 2006− 2013, in New Brunswick in 2005− 2013, and in Saskatchewan or Manitoba
in 2007− 2013. The variable is set to zero otherwise. The set up for the late period
estimating equation is nearly identical, but treatment status is deﬁned by when an
individual turned 23, and uses only individuals from the Atlantic provinces. This
equation estimates a common treatment eﬀect for the provinces oﬀering graduate
retention credits.
4.3 Inference Strategy
Inference with linear diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences can be a challenge. The prevalence of
type I errors has been known since Donald and Lang (2007) and Bertrand, Duﬂo and
Mullainathan (2004). The source of these problems is largely due to serial correlation
in the error terms. These problems can be corrected for by clustering standard errors
at the level of the policy change. Accordingly, the standard errors are calculated
using a cluster robust variance estimator, clustered by province. However, the cluster
robust variance estimator is unreliable when there are few clusters,27 or when clusters
are unbalanced.28 In this analysis, clusters are both severely unbalanced and there
are only four or ten clusters in the dataset.
To deal with the small cluster problem, Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008)
(CGM) propose a wild cluster bootstrap which they claim works with as few as
ﬁve clusters. However, Webb (2014) shows that with few clusters, the 2-point wild
cluster bootstrap is unreliable.29 With few clusters, the CGM procedure calculates
a point estimate for the P -value although the P -value is actually interval identiﬁed.
Webb (2014) proposes the following 6-point distribution for use with few clusters:
vg = −
√
3
2
,−
√
2
2
,−
√
1
2
,
√
1
2
,
√
2
2
,
√
3
2
w.p.
1
6
.
To deal with unbalanced clusters, MacKinnon and Webb (2017) show that the wild
cluster bootstrap works well. However, the simulations in that paper have a com-
27See Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008).
28See MacKinnon and Webb (2017) and Carter, Schnepel and Steigerwald (2017).
29Simplifying, the CGM procedure generates bootstrap samples by transforming residuals, from
a restricted regression, by a variable vg, drawn from a bootstrap weight distribution. The same vg
is applied to all observations within a cluster. CGM recommend using the Rademacher distribution
in which vg = ±1 with probability 0.5.
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paratively large number of clusters. Additionally, the simulations in Webb (2014)
involve only balanced clusters. This leaves open the question of whether the 6-point
distribution works well with few clusters.
MacKinnon and Webb (2017) also compare the wild cluster bootstrap to the
CRVE procedure assuming the t-statistics follow a t(G∗ − 1) distribution. With a
larger number of clusters in that paper this CRVE inference procedure understates
the P -values relative to the wild cluster bootstrap, yet it remains to be tested how
it performs with a relatively small number of clusters. To test this I compare the
usual CRVE assuming the t-statistics follow a t(G − 1) with the CRVE assuming
a t(G∗ − 1) distribution, where G∗ is the eﬀective number of clusters when testing
the treatment model calculated using the clusteﬀ Stata procedure described in Lee
and Steigerwald (2018), based on the procedure in Carter, Schnepel and Steigerwald
(2017).
I perform a small Monte Carlo exercise to test whether all these procedures work
well with few clusters. The Monte Carlo exercise uses the homoskedasticity set up
from Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008). Across 25,000 replications, data are
generated by the following equation:
yig = xig + xg + ig + g
Where xig, xg, ig, g are all drawn from a N(0, 1) distribution. This set up imposes
within cluster correlation in both the x-variable (xig + xg) and in  (ig + g). Two
cases are considered, one to match the data in the early decision analysis, and one
to match the late decision analysis. In both cases there are 1000 observations per
replication. In the early decision analysis the data are divided among nine or ten
clusters, proportional to the populations of Canadian provinces. In the late decision
analysis the observations are distributed proportionally to the populations of the four
Atlantic provinces. The clusters which are deﬁned as treated thus have proportional
size to treated provinces in the late decision and early decision analysis.
Within each replication the following regression is estimated:
yig = c++βTTreatig + βxxig + µig
Where Treatig is a binary indicator variable of treatment status. The null hy-
pothesis βT = 0 is tested using the CRVE procedure assuming the t-statistic follows
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a t(G − 1) and t(G∗ − 1) distribution. I test this procedure for ten or nine clusters
matching the LAD early decision and SLID early decision analysis, and four clusters
to match the late decision analysis. The nine and ten cluster designs each have four
treated clusters whereas the four cluster design has two treated clusters. In all cases
I report the 1%, 5%, and 10% rejection frequencies for each procedure. These results
are reported in Table 2.
Results comparing the two distributions when using the CRVE are in the ﬁrst
panel of Table 2. In all cases, as before the rejection frequency when assuming the
t(G−1) distribution is far too large. On the other hand, when assuming the t(G∗−1)
procedure the rejection frequencies are much lower. For the ten cluster design there
is slight overrejection at all three levels. For the nine cluster design there is slight
underrejection at the 1% and 5% level and overrejection at the 10% level, however
these frequencies are quite close to the size of the test. Both these designs however
have much more reasonable results than the standard CRVE procedure assuming the
t(G− 1) distribution. In the four cluster design, there is still overrejection at the 5%
and 10% level when assuming the t(G∗ − 1) distribution however the overrejection
is much less severe than the standard distribution.
The results from the 6 point bootstrap are in the second panel of Table 2. In all
cases, it underrejects severely at the 1% level. It performs worse than the t(G∗ − 1)
CRVE in the nine cluster design, with overrejection at the 5% and 10% level. In the
four cluster design however it works much better at the 5% level. Like the CRVE,
the 6 point bootstrap still overrejects severely at the 10% level. In the ten cluster
design, it works very slightly better than the CRVE at the 5% and 10% level.
The results from this Monte Carlo suggest that careful attention must be paid
to inference. In the early decision analysis, when using data from all ten provinces,
the CRVE assuming a t(G∗−1) distribution will generally result in a well-sized test.
However, in the late decision analysis, when using data from only the four Atlantic
provinces inference will be more diﬃcult. In this case, the cluster robust P -values
will be quite signiﬁcantly understated, while the wild cluster bootstrap P -values will
be correctly sized at the 5% level but overrejecting at the 10% level.
The CRVE, assuming the t(G∗−1) distribution, gives the most reasonable results.
In the nine cluster case this test is remarkably well-sized. The ten cluster design
results in the P -values being slightly understated along with the P -values being
understated at the 5% and 10% level for the four cluster design. For the four cluster
design, the 6 point bootstrap gives a well-sized test at the 5% level, while the CRVE
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gives a well-sized test at the 1% level. Thus, henceforth unless otherwise stated I
report the CRVE P -values assuming the t-statistics follow the t(G∗− 1) distribution
for the early decision analysis, and include the 6 point bootstrap results for the late
decision analysis. G∗ here is estimated using the same Monte Carlo setup where in
each replication it is estimated using the clusteﬀ Stata program described in Lee and
Steigerwald (2018). I use the average of all the replications which for the ten, nine,
and four cluster regressions are estimated to be 5.17, 3.7, and 2.8 respectively.
5 Data
The primary dataset for this paper comes from Statistics Canada's Longitudinal
Administrative Databank (LAD). The dataset uses administrative tax-ﬁle data on a
20% sample of Canadians. As the name suggests, the databank is longitudinal and
contains tax information for included individuals from 1982−2011.30 The dataset also
records age, gender, and province of residence. The LAD allows for estimation of all
of the outcomes of interest. The longitudinal nature of the data allows for a nearly
perfect measure of migration.31 Certain items in the tax code allow a researcher
to infer university enrollment. The procedure for this estimation was developed by
Morissette, Chan and Lu (2015) and is explained in the Appendix. These same items
can be used to infer whether someone graduated from university. Thus, the LAD
can be used to estimate mobility, university enrollment, and educational attainment.
The sample used for the ﬁrst part of the analysis is individuals aged 18 − 23 in
the years 2000 − 2011, and the outcomes are summarized in Table 3. Enrolled in
University is a binary indicator for whether an individual was enrolled in university
during the current tax year. Ever Enrolled in University is a binary indicator for
whether that individual was ever enrolled in university. Enrolled in University for 2
years is a binary indicator for whether the individual had been enrolled in university
for at least two years, as measured by having been enrolled for 16 full-time equivalent
months.32 University Graduate is a binary indicator for whether the individual
graduated from university, measured by the individual having been enrolled for 24
full-time equivalent months. University Dropout is a binary indicator for whether
the individual had dropped out of university. The variable is set equal to one for
30For more information see http://www23.statcan.gc.ca/imdb/p2SV.pl?Function=
getSurvey&SDDS=4107.
31Individuals in Canada are required to ﬁle both federal and provincial taxes and are thus required
to ﬁle with a province of residence in each year.
32See the appendix for details.
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individuals who have previously enrolled in university, have not graduated from
university, and are not currently enrolled in university. Student Loan Interest (to
date) measures the cumulative total of student loan interest that an individual has
claimed on her tax returns. This variable is analyzed only for those who had enrolled
in university. Finally, Student Loan Interest (to date) ≥ 0 is the same variable,
conditional on claiming a positive amount of interest paid.
Late period decisions are analyzed using data from individuals aged 23− 28 over
the years 2000 − 2011. These variables are summarized in Table 5. Three primary
outcomes are analyzed: the university graduation decisions, whether to move out
of provinces, and whether to move out of Atlantic Canada. University Graduate is
deﬁned in the same way as before. It is a binary outcome deﬁned for those who had
ever enrolled in university. It is set equal to one for those who had been enrolled
in university for at least 24 months, and set to zero otherwise. Moved Province
is a binary indicator for whether an individual had moved out of province, which
is analyzed only for university enrollees. The variable is set to one in the year an
individual moved out of province, and any subsequent year. The variable is set to
zero otherwise. Moved From Atlantic is similarly deﬁned. It is set to one in the year
in which an individual moves from the Atlantic Region, and any subsequent year. It
is set to zero otherwise.
A secondary dataset used for analysis is the conﬁdential version of the Survey of
Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID), which is conducted by Statistics Canada. In
contrast to the LAD, the SLID directly asks respondents about education outcomes.
Thus, if consistent estimates are found in both samples, we can have faith in the
imputation process used in the LAD analysis. The SLID surveys roughly 60,000
individuals each year, with individuals surveyed for six consecutive years.33 Data
is recorded at the individual level. The sample used is observations from the years
2000− 2010. The sample for the ﬁrst part of the analysis is individuals aged 18− 23
from all provinces, except for Quebec. The sample for the second part of the analysis
is individuals aged 23− 28, from the Atlantic provinces.
The analyzed early period variables from the SLID are summarized in Table 7.
In general, these variables are constructed to be similar to the variables analyzed
in the LAD. University Ever is a binary indicator for whether an individual has
ever enrolled in university. University Dropout is a binary indicator for whether an
33Unfortunately, with the SLID being a survey, there is some attrition. Survey weights are used
to correct for attrition.
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individual has ever dropped out of university. This variable is set equal to one if the
individual had ever enrolled in university, is not currently enrolled in university, and
is not a university graduate. College Ever and College Dropout are similarly deﬁned
for individuals in college. Finally, Post Sec. Ed. Ever and Post Sec. Ed. Dropout
are deﬁned in the same way if the individual had enrolled(dropped out of) college or
university.
Table 9 summarizes the late period variables from the SLID. These variables an-
alyze decisions that would have been made by individuals at a slightly later stage of
life. Same Prov. as High School is a binary indicator of whether the individual cur-
rently lives in the same province as where they attended high school. This variable is
set equal to one for individuals in the same province, and set equal to zero otherwise.
The variable is also summarized for individuals who had attended university, shown
in the second row of the table. University Graduate is a binary indicator for whether
an individual had graduated from university. Similarly, College Graduate is a binary
indicator for whether an individual had graduated from college, and Post Sec. Ed.
Graduate an indicator for college or university graduation.
6 Results
LAD  Early Period Decisions
Results from the early period LAD regressions can be found in Table 4. The results
from the regression suggest that the programs had some impacts. In general, the
likelihood of individuals enrolling in university was unchanged. The coeﬃcient for
Ever Enrolled in University is both very small in magnitude and highly insigniﬁcant.
Similarly, the coeﬃcient on Enrolled in University for 2 years is not signiﬁcant. Uni-
versity Dropout is estimated to decrease by a relatively large 4.1%, and the coeﬃcient
has a cluster robust P -value of 0.050. It is not too surprising that the coeﬃcient
on University Graduate is not signiﬁcant, as the sample here is individuals 1823.
Finally, Student Loans Interest suggests that student loan interest has decreased,
however Student Loans Interest > 0 is less statistically signiﬁcant. These coeﬃcients
are both economically signiﬁcant. The sample for these variables is individuals who
had enrolled in university, aged 1823, many of whom will still be in school.
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LAD  Late Period Decisions
Table 6 shows the estimates of the late period decisions using the LAD. The results
show that the likelihood of graduating increased for males at the 10% level. The
coeﬃcient for University Graduate is estimated to increase by 0.062% for males
with some statistical signiﬁcance. The estimates on migration decisions suggest
that migration decisions were not aﬀected. In the combined sample, the estimates
for both Moved Province and Moved From Province are statistically insigniﬁcant.
The estimate for Moved Province for males has a cluster robust P -value of 0.076,
with a coeﬃcient of 0.029. This is the opposite of the goal of the programs as
it suggests individuals were more likely to move. The other coeﬃcients for the
migration variables are statistically insigniﬁcant. Taken together since no variable
is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level, these estimates suggest that the programs
were ineﬀective in retaining university educated individuals within province. This is
consistent with the evidence given by the Nova Scotia government when it cancelled
its retention program.
SLID  Early Period Decisions
The results of the early period analysis using the SLID data can be found in Table
8. The results for the combined sample are displayed in the top of the table, results
for males in the middle, and results for females in the bottom. In general, the
results for males and females and the combined sample are quite similar, with the
majority of estimates being quite statistically insigniﬁcant. One notable exception
is the coeﬃcient for University Dropout, which is estimated to decrease by −0.049
in the combined sample. This estimate is statistically signiﬁcant at 5% using cluster
robust standard errors, and signiﬁcant at the 10% level using the 6-point bootstrap
P -value. Recall that the t(G∗ − 1) CRVE procedure used here is quite well-sized in
this nine cluster case. Interestingly, when the impacts are estimated separately by
gender, the estimate for males is both larger and of greater statistical signiﬁcance
than for females. In fact, using the CRVE P -values the coeﬃcients on University
Dropout for the combined sample and for males are the only coeﬃcients signiﬁcant
at the 10% level with bootstrap P -values. This suggests that the programs did not
have any impact on university or college enrollment, as none of these estimates is
remotely statistically signiﬁcant. In this case we can be conﬁdent of the P -values as
the Monte Carlo results would suggest we have a well-sized test.
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SLID  Late Period Decisions
The results of the late period analysis using the SLID can be found in Table 10.
These estimates are meant to measure the extent to which the programs inﬂuenced
graduation rates and migration decisions. The most notable result from the table
is that the estimated coeﬃcients on the Same Province variables are negative in all
three panels. This is especially interesting as the stated intention of the programs
was to keep recent graduates in province. The majority of the coeﬃcients are not
remotely statistically signiﬁcant when using the CRVE or 6-point P -values for in-
ference. The one exception is the coeﬃcient on Same Province for males, who had
attended university, which is signiﬁcant at the 10% and 5% level for each procedure.
This could suggest that these individuals were less likely to stay in province when
the graduate retention programs were on oﬀer. The lack of statistical signiﬁcance
on the other coeﬃcients suggests that these individuals were not any more likely
to graduate from either college or university. Again, the 6-point P -values can be
thought of as a well-sized test at the 5% level for the P -value.
6.1 Robustness
As a robustness check I have collected the historical retention rate from the Maclean's
Magazine University Rankings.34 The university ranking data contains self reported
statistics from nearly 50 universities in Canada. The annual nature of the rankings
allows for the construction of a panel, for this paper I have a panel covering the years
2002 through 2013.
The Maclean's variable measures the retention rate for each university in the
sample. The retention rate reports the proportion of ﬁrst year full time students
who re-enroll at the same university in the following academic year. This variable
is a good proxy for overall graduation rates as the majority of individuals who do
not ﬁnish university leave before their second year of university.35 The estimates
in Table 11 are presented as both pooled estimates and estimates on a province by
province basis.
The estimated impact of the graduate retention programs shows that the reten-
tion rate has increased by a reasonably large 2.315 percentage points. However, the
statistical signiﬁcance of this estimate is somewhat wanting, as the 6-point bootstrap
34I'm very appreciative of Mary Dwyer from Maclean's for providing me with past editions of
the Maclean's rankings.
35See the Globe and Mail focus on `Our Time to Lead: Education' from October 6, 2012.
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P -value is 14.3%. The province-speciﬁc coeﬃcients in the bottom of the table are
interesting, as they suggest that the programs in Manitoba and Saskatchewan had
much larger impacts than the programs in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. Neither
the cluster-robust P -values nor the 6-point P -values are reliable for these coeﬃcients
as only one group is `treated'.36
7 Conclusions
Several provinces in Canada have introduced generous tax credits to increase the
local stock of college educated individuals. Although the programs were designed to
keep individuals in a province after graduation they explicitly encourage graduation.
The impact of these programs on a variety of education and migration decisions
is evaluated using both administrative and survey data. The programs have no
discernible impact on university enrollment. University dropout rates decrease by
4.1% for individuals aged 18-23. Finally, the programs had no impact on out of
province migration for recent graduates.
From a policy perspective, the implications of this analysis are somewhat am-
biguous. The credits were introduced to discourage interprovincial migration. While
it appears the credits did not change the pattern of migration, they did decrease
university dropout rates. If those individuals who did not dropout go on to gradu-
ate, then the programs may have met the goal of increasing the average education
level in the province. It is possible that the programs are superior to the Merit
Scholarships in that they both oﬀer ﬁnancial relief for local students, and directly
encourage individuals to graduate. Past research has also found the Merit programs
to be distortionary. Cohodes and Goodman (2014) ﬁnd college completion rates to
decrease. Sjoquist and Winters (2013a) ﬁnd that merit scholarships decrease the
likelihood that a student majored in a STEM ﬁeld. Future research should examine
whether the retention credits had similar distortionary eﬀects.
The credits are also perhaps a better alternative to in-state tuition, as they
eﬀectively reduce the net tuition for those who stay in province. Aghion et al.
(2009) argue that investments in educational institutions in states far away from the
technology frontier tend to beneﬁt states closer to the frontier, as graduates of said
institutions tend to migrate toward the frontier. Thus, it is perhaps preferable to
oﬀer reduced tuition for those who stay in province, as opposed to those who attend
36See MacKinnon and Webb (2017, 2020, 2018) for more details.
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school in province. Whether this change would be regressive in its incidence is
beyond the scope of this paper, though it is encouraging that the credits reduced the
amount paid in student loan interest. While the programs appear to encourage those
enrolled in university to ﬁnish their education, the costly nature of these programs
makes further experimentation diﬃcult.
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Table 1: Summary of the various Graduate Retention Programs
SK MB NS NB
maximum amount 20k 25k 15k 20k
rebate per year 10%,20% 4k, 10% 2.5k 4k
NPV ($000) @ 5% 16.9 14.1 13.3 12.6
refundable credit Y* N N N
roll-over credit N* Y N Y
eligibility duration 7 10 6 20
application req. N N Y Y
tuition based Y Y N Y
tuit. % refunded 100% 60% - 50%
program costs 35m 34m 25m
Notes: * reﬂects the change in 2012 that Saskatchewan announced, where the
credit was no longer refundable, but would instead roll-over from one year to the
next. The NPV calculation assumes a 5% discount rate, suﬃcient earnings to get
the maximum credit in all years, and $22,663 in tuition paid in earning a 4 year
B.A. degree from Queen's University.
Table 2: Treatment Model Monte Carlo Results
10 Clusters 9 Clusters 4 Clusters
CRVE
t(G-1) t(G*-1) t(G-1) t(G*-1) t(G-1) t(G*-1)
1% rej. freq. 3.804% 1.200% 6.024% 0.568% 8.224% 1.000%
5% rej. freq. 11.464% 6.784% 15.468% 4.752% 22.924% 8.104%
10% rej. freq. 19.096% 13.668% 23.724% 11.308% 33.612% 18.536%
6 pt. Boot
1% rej. freq. 0.180% 0.644% 0.176%
5% rej. freq. 5.504% 7.924% 4.900%
10% rej. freq. 11.868% 14.836% 17.732%
Notes: Results from 25,000 Monte Carlo simulations. Average G∗ for the 10, 9,
and 4 cluster designs across all replications were 5.17, 3.7, and 2.8 respectively.
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Table 3: LAD - Summary statistics - Early Period
GRP Not GRP
Pre Post Pre Post
Enrolled in University .149 .229 .108 .146
Ever Enrolled in University .448 .372 .39 .278
Enrolled in University for 2 years .751 .607 .788 .583
University Graduate .622 .417 .639 .348
University Dropout .309 .27 .29 .316
Student Loan Interest (to date) 220 20 110 10
Student Loan Interest (to date) > 0 300 500 920 270
Table 4: LAD - Regression Results - Early Period
Coeﬀ. t(G-1) t(G*-1) Obs
Ever Enrolled In University −0.00098 0.975 0.976 458692x
Enrolled in University for 2 years 0.015444 0.452 0.476 171163x
University Graduate 0.017156 0.156 0.197 171163x
University Dropout −0.04111 0.021 0.050 171163x
Student Loan Interest (to date) −15.7603 0.001 0.009 171163x
Student Loan Interest (to date) > 0 −42.8224 0.029 0.061 10208x
Note: Reported are the P -values from the CRVE assuming the two above
distributions for the t-statistics. Sample consists of individuals aged 18-23 from
2000-2011 in all Provinces. Treatment Deﬁned by Year when 18. 5.17 is used as the
G∗ here.
Table 5: LAD - Summary Statistics - Late Period
GRP Not GRP
Pre Post Pre Post
Female 0.512 0.5 0.496 0.5
University Graduate 0.587 0.652 0.52 0.538
Moved 0.458 0.322 0.529 0.32
Moved From Atlantic 0.423 0.301 0.497 0.302
Obs 197000 86800 101400 22000
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Table 6: LAD - Regression Results - Late Period
Males and Females Coeﬀ t(G-1) t(G*-1)
University Graduate 0.034 0.039 0.107
Moved Province 0.009 0.662 0.688
Moved From Atlantic 0.001 0.917 0.923
Males
University Graduate 0.062 0.030 0.093
Moved Province 0.029 0.020 0.076
Moved From Atlantic 0.013 0.062 0.137
Females
University Graduate 0.014 0.380 0.438
Moved Province -0.011 0.707 0.729
Moved From Atlantic -0.008 0.144 0.225
Note: Reported are the P -values from the CRVE assuming the two above
distributions for the t-statistics. Sample consists of individuals aged 23-28 from
2000-2011 in all Atlantic Provinces. Treatment Deﬁned by Year when 23. 2.8 is
used as the G∗ here.
Table 7: SLID - Summary statistics - All Provinces
GRP Not GRP
Pre Post Pre Post
University Ever 0.442 0.404 0.397 0.384
University Dropout 0.089 0.022 0.090 0.037
College Ever 0.688 0.634 0.649 0.635
College Dropout 0.111 0.061 0.119 0.051
Post Sec. Ed. Ever 0.319 0.280 0.349 0.357
Post Sec. Ed. Dropout 0.129 0.113 0.135 0.072
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eTable 8: SLID - School Enrollment and Dropout Decisions
Males and Females
t(G-1) t(G*-1) 6-point
Coeﬀ. OLS CRVE CRVE Boot Obs
University Ever -0.007 0.741 0.840 0.850 0.884 37848
University Dropout -0.049 0.004 0.002 0.029 0.087 13226
College Ever 0.006 0.760 0.781 0.795 0.890 37964
College Dropout -0.003 0.822 0.517 0.553 0.660 24396
Post Sec. Ed. Ever 0.016 0.419 0.422 0.468 0.613 37588
Post Sec. Ed. Dropout 0.046 0.054 0.002 0.029 0.111 13728
Males
t(G-1) t(G*-1) 6-point
Coeﬀ. OLS CRVE CRVE Boot Obs
University Ever 0.036 0.226 0.255 0.320 0.408 18592
University Dropout -0.075 0.007 0.004 0.038 0.092 5269
College Ever 0.032 0.269 0.139 0.213 0.351 18654
College Dropout -0.015 0.520 0.538 0.572 0.712 10877
Post Sec. Ed. Ever 0.000 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.993 18452
Post Sec. Ed. Dropout 0.030 0.389 0.352 0.406 0.548 6671
Females
t(G-1) t(G*-1) 6-point
Coeﬀ. OLS CRVE CRVE Boot Obs
University Ever -0.053 0.073 0.284 0.346 0.395 19256
University Dropout -0.031 0.145 0.316 0.374 0.431 7957
College Ever -0.028 0.277 0.385 0.435 0.545 19310
College Dropout 0.003 0.884 0.882 0.889 0.911 13519
Post Sec. Ed. Ever 0.023 0.394 0.436 0.481 0.621 19136
Post Sec. Ed. Dropout 0.049 0.111 0.214 0.283 0.332 7057
Note: Reported are the P -values for the treatment for any given outcome variable.
Sample consists of individuals aged 18-23 from 2000-2010 in Provinces except
Quebec. Treatment Deﬁned by Year when 18. 3.7 is used as the G∗ here.
Table 9: SLID - Summary statistics - Atlantic Provinces
GRP Not GRP
Pre Post Pre Post
Same Prov as High School 0.776 0.766 0.690 0.719
 " |Attended University 0.765 0.757 0.676 0.740
University Graduate 0.354 0.275 0.317 0.243
College Graduate 0.583 0.542 0.585 0.553
Post Sec. Ed. Graduate 0.543 0.474 0.547 0.468
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Table 10: SLID - Migration and Graduation Decisions
Males and Females
t(G-1) t(G*-1) 6-point
Coeﬀ. OLS CRVE CRVE Boot Obs
Same Prov as High School -0.062 0.190 0.343 0.405 0.371 9324
 " |Attended University -0.113 0.031 0.053 0.126 0.172 7324
University Graduate 0.049 0.382 0.457 0.506 0.757 3959
College Graduate 0.059 0.307 0.515 0.557 0.652 4958
Post Sec. Ed. Graduate 0.061 0.168 0.314 0.380 0.558 7324
Males
t(G-1) t(G*-1) 6-point
Coeﬀ. OLS CRVE CRVE Boot Obs
Same Prov as High School -0.054 0.404 0.388 0.455 0.359 4467
 " | Attended University -0.163 0.023 0.027 0.088 0.047 3273
University Graduate 0.117 0.156 0.333 0.397 0.350 1599
College Graduate 0.088 0.269 0.148 0.229 0.211 2401
Post Sec. Ed. Graduate 0.114 0.085 0.210 0.287 0.166 3273
Females
t(G-1) t(G*-1) 6-point
Coeﬀ. OLS CRVE CRVE Boot Obs
Same Prov as High School -0.084 0.178 0.428 0.480 0.434 4857
 " | Attended University -0.090 0.187 0.284 0.354 0.234 4051
University Graduate 0.012 0.869 0.572 0.607 0.839 2360
College Graduate 0.025 0.748 0.853 0.863 0.806 2557
Post Sec. Ed. Graduate 0.002 0.968 0.972 0.974 0.987 4051
Note: Reported are the P -values for the treatment for any given outcome variable.
Sample consists of individuals aged 23-28 from 2000-2010 in all Atlantic Provinces.
Treatment Deﬁned by Year when 23. 3.7 is used as the G∗ here.
Table 11: Maclean's - Percentage of Students Returning for 2nd Year
Coeﬀ. OLS CRVE 6-pt Boot
All 2.315 0.021 0.053 0.143
SK 4.594 0.000 0.000 0.622
MB 4.006 0.000 0.000 0.530
NS 2.141 0.000 0.001 0.320
NB -1.009 0.043 0.074 0.550
Notes:Estimates Clustered by Province
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8 Appendix
The procedure used by Morissette, Chan and Lu (2015) (MCL, henceforth) to esti-
mate university enrollment is described in detail in the appendix of their paper. This
procedure borrows heavily from theirs.37 Since 1999 the tax code has the following
three variables which allow for inference of university enrollment rates:
• tuition fees for self
• educational deduction for full-time students
• educational deduction for part-time students
MCL use these variables to construct enrollment rates, the procedure is as follows:
1. I take the total education deduction for full time students and divide by the
maximum amount allowed per month by the Canada Revenue Agency.38 This
gives the total number of months the individual was enrolled full-time in college
or university that year.
2. A similar calculation is performed for the part-time months.
3. An estimate of the months of full-time-equivalent enrollment is derived. Full-
time months are counted as 1.0 months and part-time months are counted as
0.6 months.
4. The amount claimed in tuition is divided by the number of months estimated
in step 3. This yields an estimated tuition per month.39
5. The monthly average tuition amount is multiplied by 8, to compute a full-time-
equivalent annual amount.
6. The annual amount from step 5 is compared to 0.8 − 2.0 times the annual
provincial average undergraduate tuition amount.40 If the annual amount is
37I am grateful to René Morissette for providing me with SAS code to implement the procedure.
38The maximum amounts come from either Morissette, Chan and Lu (2015) or Neill (2013).
39To correctly estimate the average tuition, the amount reported is converted into a full-time-
equivalent tuition amount.
40The values used are two year averages, owing to the overlap of the school year and the tax
year. The tuition values used from 1977  2011 come from the following sources: the values from
1977  2000 come from Johnson and Rahman (2005), I thank David R. Johnson for providing me
with these values; 2001  2008 come from MCL; 2009  2011 from Statistics Canada Table B.2.9
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/81-582-x/2014001/tbl/tblb2.9-eng.htm.
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within the interval, then the variable university enrolled is set equal to 1, it
is set equal to 0 otherwise.41
Building on the MCL procedure, I take advantage of the panel nature of the
dataset to construct additional variables. I sum the months variable from step three
over all the years in the dataset, to estimate the total months spent in university.
I then compare this variable to a number of key thresholds. For persistence, I
estimate whether the individual completed two or more years of university, by cal-
culating whether the total number of months exceeded 16.
Similarly, I estimate whether someone graduated from university by comparing
the total months variable to 24. University programs are typically 32 months in
length in most of Canada, but programs in Quebec and non-honours undergraduate
programs can be 24 months in length.42
Finally, university dropout is set equal to 1 if an individual was a) not already
a university graduate, b) had previously been enrolled in university, and c) was not
currently enrolled in university.
41Unfortunately, for the purposes of this study, the tax system does not diﬀerentiate between
college and university enrollment. The MCL procedure uses the fact that university tuition is much
more costly than college tuition to infer university attendance. In 2013 average undergraduate
university tuition in Canada was $5,772 (see statscan table referenced above), while average college
tuition in Ontario was $1,900 (http://www.tcu.gov.on.ca/pepg/audiences/colleges/costs_
coll.html#tuition).
42The majority of dropouts occur early in university careers. Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner
(2013) report that of those who dropped out of one particular college  40% dropped out in year
1, 34.4% in year 2, and 25.1% in year 3. Similarly, the Maclean's graduation rate is on average
86.5% of the retention rate, suggesting that the largest fraction of dropouts leave after the ﬁrst
year. Thus the majority of those who ﬁnished 24 months of university will be university graduates.
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